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Chapter 5
Predicting U.S. bank failures: A
comparison of logit and data
mining models
5.1 Introduction
The financial crisis that started in 2007 has led to large-scale bank failures in the
United States. According to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (hererafter
FDIC), 334 banks failed during 2008-2010 compared to a total of 21 bank failures
between 2002 and 2007.1 Banking crises have a serious negative impact on the econ-
omy. For example, the most recent financial crisis has led to a cumulative reduction
of 31% of U.S. output; its fiscal cost amounted to 4.5% of U.S. GDP between 2007–
2010 (Laeven and Valencia, 2013).2 It is therefore crucial to predict bank failures for
preventing banks from failing or minimizing the cost of bank failures to taxpayers
(Thomson, 1991).
Although several approaches have been applied to evaluate bank risk, such as su-
pervisory ratings, financial ratio and peer group analysis, and comprehensive bank
1 The list of bank failures is obtained from the website:
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html.
2 Fiscal costs are gross fiscal outlays for the restructuring of the financial sector. They include fiscal
costs for bank recapitalizations but without asset purchases and direct liquidity assistance from the
Treasury.
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risk assessment systems, statistical models, like the logit model, have two advan-
tages compared to these other approaches. First, statistical models try to identify
high-risk banks reasonably well in advance, while the other three approaches fo-
cus on the current condition of a bank. Second, statistical models can adopt various
advanced techniques to determine the leading relationship between financial indica-
tors and bank failures. Therefore, statistical models to predict bank failures can be
useful for bank regulators.
Apart from traditional statistical models, data mining models, such as neural
networks and support vector machines, have been employed for predicting firm fail-
ures (Min and Lee, 2005; Shin, Lee, and Kim, 2005). However, few papers have
employed these models in predicting (recent) bank failures even though bank fail-
ures arguably have more negative consequences than non-financial firm failures.
Studying bank failures in the United States during the Global Financial Crisis may
yield useful insights for bank supervisors.
In addition, most existing research using data mining models arbitrarily splits
the data set into a part over which the parameters are estimated (the ex post sample)
and a part for prediction (the ex ante sample). For example, Shin, Lee, and Kim
(2005) arbitrarily choose 80% of the data as the ex post sample and the remain-
ing 20% as the ex ante example. Min and Lee (2005) and Boyacioglu, Kara, and
Baykan (2009) use a similar approach. However, prediction models typically use
past information to predict bank failures in the future. Thus, ex post and ex ante
samples should be carefully distinguished.
This chapter applies the logit model, neural networks and support vector ma-
chines to predict 293 bank failures in the United States during 2002–2010 based
on 16 financial ratios and their rates of change. These financial ratios cover Capital
adequacy, Asset quality, Management quality, Earnings, Liquidity and Sensitivity to
market risk (also known as CAMELS which is a supervisory rating framework for
evaluating a bank’s comprehensive financial condition). We define the sample from
2002 to 2009 as the ex post sample to estimate the models, and use the data in 2010
for out-of-sample tests. As is common in the literature on early warning models, we
take a one-year prediction horizon. Our results show that support vector machines
predict bank failures ex ante better than neural networks. The logit model identifies
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bank failures less precisely ex post than data mining models, but more precisely
ex ante. Specifically, ex ante the logit model issues fewer missed failures and false
alarms than data mining models. Finally, the logit model predicts bank (non)failures
with a high accuracy, indicating that the logit model can be a helpful tool for bank
supervisors.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 reviews related
studies. Section 5.3 briefly describes the methodologies. After the description of
the sample and variables in Section 5.4, empirical results and sensitivity tests are
shown and discussed in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Literature review
Research on the prediction of non-financial firm or bank failures dates back to the
late 1960s, and since then it has become an important research topic. Up to now, var-
ious statistical methods and data mining approaches have been applied in predicting
these failures.
Altman (1968) is the first study to employ a discriminant analysis model using
Z-Scores to predict firm failures. Sinkey (1975) employs the same model to pre-
dict bank failures in the U.S. from 1969 to 1972. In a later study, Altman (1977)
introduces quadratic discriminant analysis to predict the failures of the Savings and
Loan Associations industry in the U.S. for the period 1966–1973. Meyer and Pifer
(1970) employ multiple regression analysis to predict bank failures in the U.S. More
recently, Lam and Moy (2002) combine several discriminant models to enhance the
accuracy of their predictions. Their empirical results show that the combined dis-
criminant models outperform single discriminant models.
Martin (1977) employs the logit model to predict bank failures in the U.S. in
the 1930s. The logit model is a non-linear model where the dependent variable is
a dummy variable, which is one for firm failure and zero otherwise. After that,
various articles adopted this model to predict non-financial firm or bank failures in
different countries (cf. Konstandina, 2006; Boyacioglu, et al. 2009). Canbas, Cabuk
and Kilic (2005) construct an integrated early warning system (which combines
several models covering principal component analysis, discriminant analysis, logit
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and probit models) to predict Turkish bank failures during the period 1997–2003.
Poghosyan and Cihak (2009) apply the logit model to investigate the leading
indicators of European bank failures from mid-1990s to 2008. Altman, Cizel, and
Rijken (2014) apply the logit model to predict bank distress in 15 Western European
countries and the U.S. during 2007–2012. They find that prediction based on a given
model displays cross-country variation in the classification of bank distress. Betz et
al. (2014) employ the logit model to predict bank distress in the European banking
sector during 2000–2013. Their results suggest that this model yields useful out-of-
sample predictions.
Other models are also applied to predict bank failures. Molina (2002) employs
a hazard model to investigate the determinants of bank failures in the Venezuelan
banking crisis during 1994–1995. Wong, Wong, and Leung (2010) apply the probit
model to predict banking distress in 11 EMEAP countries during 1990–2007, and
their results show that the prediction of their model is satisfactory. Likewise, Cole
and Wu (2009) find that the simple probit model performs better than a simple
hazard model in predicting U.S. bank failures during the Global Financial Crisis.
Recently, neural network models and support vector machines (both are data
mining models) have become popular to predict bank and firm failures. Data mining
models capture the relationships between dependent and independent variables by
learning from the data, and they impose fewer constraints than traditional statistical
models, i.e. the logit model, on the distribution of the data. In other words, data
mining models are machine learning systems and are applied to predict failures by
modifying their internal parameters.
Min and Lee (2005) apply support vector machines, multiple discriminant anal-
ysis, logit model, and three-layer neural networks to predict firm failures in Korea
during 2000–2002. Their results show that support vector machines outperform the
other methods. Shin, Lee, and Kim (2005) apply support vector machines and neu-
ral networks to predict bank failures in Korea from 1996 to 1999. Their findings
suggest that support vector machines outperform neural networks in predicting cor-
porate bankruptcy. Still, only few papers have applied data mining models to predict
bank failures. Salchenberger, Cinar, and Lash (1992) is an older study. These authors
apply the logit model and neural networks to predict thrift institution failures in the
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US during 1986–1987. They find that neural networks predict failures as well or
better than the logit model. Recently, Boyacioglu, Kara and Baykan (2009) employ
neural networks, support vector machines and multivariate models to predict bank
failures in Turkey between 1997 and 2003, and find that neural networks have the
best prediction performance. Lo´pez-Iturriaga, Lo´pez-de-Foronda, and Sanz (2010)
apply a neural network model to predict U.S. bank failures occurred in the first half
of 2010 and find that this model has a prediction accuracy of around 60%. In con-




The first model we apply to predict bank failures is the logit model. Let yi denote
a dummy variable that takes the value of one when bank i fails and zero otherwise.
Then, the probability that bank i fails is calculated using the cumulative logistic
function:
P(yi = 1|Zi) = 11+ e−Zi , i = 1, ...,N, (5.1)
and
Zi = a+ xib+ ε i, i = 1, ...,N,
where a is a constant, x denotes a vector of leading indicators, b is a vector of
coefficients for x, and ε i is the error term.
5.3.2 Neural Networks
Neural networks (NNs) are a family of statistical learning algorithms. For a general
description of neural networks, see e.g., Franses and Van Dijk (2000, Chapter 5).
The basic neural network consists of three layers: one input layer, one hidden layer
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(which is invisible from the outside; in other words, it is a black box), and one output
layer. Each layer is composed of one or more nodes. Similar to the definition of the
hidden layer, the nodes in the hidden layer are defined as hidden nodes.
In the input layer, each input node represents an exogenous variable, a financial
ratio in this chapter, and all inputs taken together represent the financial situation of
a bank. Each node in the hidden layer is connected to all inputs and to all output
nodes based on certain weights. The nodes in the output layer are the result of the
model. This layer tells us whether a bank is in a healthy or a distressed situation.
A simple example of a neural network is shown in Figure 5.1. In this chapter,
we choose a three-layer neural network with a single hidden layer following Kuan
and White (1994) as they claim that a single hidden layer is appropriate for most
economic problems. For simplicity, we assume that there are three nodes in the
hidden layer in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1. The structure of a simple neural network
Notes: X is a vector of inputs, in this chapter it stands for a vector of financial indicators; Wi (i =
1, 2, 3) is the weight vector from inputs to the hidden node i; gi (i = 1, 2, 3) and f are pre-determined
activation functions and gi(x) = f (x) = (1+ e−x)−1. gi(x) is the activation function linking the
inputs to the hidden nodes, and f (x) is the activation function linking the hidden nodes to the outputs;
ui is the weight from the hidden node i to the output node y; and y is the output variable which stands
for whether a bank fails or not in this chapter.
Figure 5.2 zooms in and shows how the hidden node g1 in Figure 5.1 is con-
nected to the input nodes. For simplicity, we assume that there are only two input
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variables. The values of input nodes (x1, x2) entering a hidden node are multiplied
by pre-determined weights (w11, w21). Then they are added to produce a single num-
ber (W1X) in Figure 5.2. Before leaving the hidden node, this number is passes on
to an activation function (g1) and finally produces the estimate (gˆ1) which will en-
ter the output layer node. Mathematically, the final estimate, gˆ1, leaving the hidden













where X = [x1, x2] is the vector of input variables and X
′
is the transpose of X.
W1 = [w11,w21] is the vector of weights for inputs.
Figure 5.2. The structure of the hidden node g1
The structure shown in Figure 5.1, combined with Equation (5.2), implies that
the estimated output of the output layer, yˆ is defined as
























where U is defined as [u1, u2, u3] and G
′
is the transpose of G which is defined as
[g1, g2, g3]. Weights, W and U, in this network need to be estimated.
In this chapter, these weights are estimated using back propagation (backward
propagation of errors), a commonly-used gradient learning algorithm (Tkacz, 2001).
Salchenberger, Char and Lash (1992, p. 905) claim that “Back propagation is an ap-
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proach to supervised network learning which permits weights to be learned from
experience, based on empirical observations on the object of interest.” The idea be-
hind back propagation is simple. The estimated output yˆ is evaluated against the
expected output. In this chapter, the estimated output is the estimated probability of
bank failures based on a neural network model, and the expected output is whether
a bank fails or not according to the FDIC. If the error (the difference between the
estimated output and the expected output) is not satisfactory, weights between lay-
ers are modified and estimations are repeated again and again until the error is small
enough. The implementation of back propagation can be found in Eberhart and Dob-
bins (1990, p. 43–49).
5.3.3 Support Vector Machines
This section gives a brief description of support vector machines (SVMs). The goal
of a SVM model in a three dimensional space is to find a plane which separates
the data correctly into two classes, in other words, to find a decision rule which
distinguishes banks that failed from banks that did not fail. Similarly, in a higher
dimensional space, a SVM model is applied to find a hyperplane which separates
the data correctly into two classes. For a general description of SVMs, see Press et
al. (2007, Chapter 16) and Vapnik (2000, Chapter 9).
Let the data set be S = {xi, yi} (i = 1, ...,N) where xi (∈ Rm) is the input data
vector, and yi is the category variable which takes the value of 1 when bank i fails
and −1 otherwise following Press et al. (2007, Chapter 16).
Assuming that there is a hyperplane defined as
h (xi) = α · xi + β = 0, (5.4)
such that all the points with yi = 1 lie on one side of the plane (h (xi) ≥ 0), and
all the points with yi = −1 lie on the other side of the plane (h (xi) ≤ 0). Thus the
hyperplane h(x) in Equation (5.4) is defined as the decision rule to evaluate whether
a bank fails or not.
In fact, more than one hyperplane can separate the data. For example, a given
hyperplane h (xi) can be equally expressed by all hyperplanes, λα · xi + λβ = 0
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(λ ∈ R+). In order to separate the data as good as possible, one can “pick the
hyperplane that has the largest margin, i.e., maximizes the perpendicular distance to
points nearest to the hyperplane on both sides” (Press et al., 2007, p. 884).
In this case, the distance (or margin shown in Figure 5.3) between all data points
and the hyperplane, h(xi), is as large as possible. Without loss of generality, one can
choose a canonical hyperplane which separates the data from the hyperplane by a
margin of at least 1. Then, this hyperplane satisfies:
α · xi + β ≥ +1, if yi = +1,
α · xi + β ≤ −1, if yi = −1.
(5.5)
We employ the same symbol α and β for the new hyperplane following Press
et al. (2007). These two equations are referred to as parallel bounding hyperplanes
shown in Figure 5.3. Based on geometry, the perpendicular distance between the
bounding hyperplanes equals 2× margin = 2(α · α)−1/2 (Press et al., 2007).
Figure 5.3. Support vector machines in the ideal case of a linearly separable sample
Notes: One wants to classify regions containing triangles and circles. The region
defined by −1 ≤ h(xi) ≤ 1 are chosen to maximize the margin. At the bounding
hyperplanes, there are several points which are defined as support vectors.
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Equation (5.5) is equivalent to
yi(α · xi + β) ≥ 1, i = 1, ...,N, (5.6)
and the maximization of 2(α · α)−1/2 is equivalent to the minimization of 12 (α · α)
where the factor 1/2 is introduced to simplify some algebra (Press et al., 2007).
Therefore, one can find the largest margin by solving the quadratic programming
Min 12 (α · α)
s.t. yi(α · xi + β) ≥ 1, i = 1, 2, ...,N.
(5.7)
The data cannot be fully separated, i.e., in Figure 5.3 there may be some trian-
gles and/or circles falling into the region defined by −1 ≤ h(xi) ≤ 1. To separate
the data with a minimal error, Vapnik (2000) introduces so-called slack variables ξi
for each bank observation xi. If the observation xi is separated correctly by a plane,
then ξi = 0, otherwise ξi > 0. Then, Equation (5.6) is modified as
yi(α · xi + β) ≥ 1− ξi; ξi ≥ 0; i = 1, 2, ...,N. (5.8)
It is clear that ξi measures the degree of misclassification of the data xi, so














ξi , C ≥ 0, (5.9)
where C is a pre-determined constant. The larger the value of C is, the more pre-
cisely the data are separated.
Finally, if the sample is not linearly separable in a low dimensional space, one
can map these points to a higher dimensional space, using a function φ : Rm → RM
(higher dimensional feature space), in which the data is linearly separable. Then,
xi · xj is mapped to φ(xi) · φ(xj) ∆= K(xi, xj), where K(·, ·) is defined as a kernel
function (Vapnik, 2000). In previous studies, four types of kernel functions have
widely been used, namely the simple dot function, the polynomial function, the
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radial basis function and two layer neural networks.
5.3.4 Prediction framework
This section describes the implementation of predicting bank failures using different
models. A good prediction model should not only accurately predict bank failures,
but should also issue few false alarms. Thus, to evaluate how the three models per-
form for banks that do not fail, we construct a sample including both bank failures
and bank non-failures. Similar to Altman (1968) and Salchenberger, Cinar, and Lash
(1992), we create a match-pair bank sample by the selection rules: (1) near in asset
size [-30%, 30%] to the bank that failed in the quarter of failure, and (2) located
in the same state. The first rule controls for different characteristics of large and
small banks, as observed by Cole and Gunther (1994). The second rule controls for
differences in economic and competitive conditions across different states.
Then, we split the sample into an ex post sample including data from 2002
up to and including 2009 and an ex ante sample consisting of data for 2010. We
employ the ex post sample to estimate parameters in all three models, and evaluate
the prediction performance of three estimated models in-sample (ex post sample)
and out-of-sample (ex ante sample).
Similar to Chapter 2, if the estimated outcome (yˆi, i = 1, 2, ...,N) does not
signal a bank failure when this bank fails according to the FDIC, it is labeled as ‘a
missed failure’. If the estimated outcome signals a bank failure while this bank does
not fail according to the FDIC, it is labeled as ‘a false alarm’ (see Table 5.1).
Table 5.1. Contingency table for assessing prediction outcomes
FDIC
bank failures banks did not fail
Bank failures predicted ‘Correct failures’ ‘False alarms’
Bank failures not predicted ‘Missed failures’ ‘Correct non-failures’
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Logit model
The classification of banks into failed and non-failed banks in the logit model is
based on the estimated probability yˆi. In line with Shin, Lee, and Kim (2005), the
cut-off probability is set at 0.5 and the classifications are determined on the basis of
the following rule:
If yˆi < 0.5, the bank is classified to the group of banks that did not fail.
If yˆi ≥ 0.5, the bank is classified to the group of bank failures.
Data mining models
As motivated in Section 5.3.2, we choose a neural network model with a single hid-
den layer. In this model the number of hidden nodes depends on the number of the
inputs. According to the Kolmogorov theorem, the number of nodes in the hidden
layer is Nnode = 2l + 1, where l is the number of the inputs. So, the architecture of
the neural network model is set and only the weights between layers, namelyW and
U in Equation (5.3), need to be estimated. The MATLAB programs of neural net-
works are downloaded from the internet.3 According to these programs, estimation
continues until the error between the estimated output is smaller than 10−4.
For the SVM model, we define bank failures as a non-linear problem following
Min et al. (2006) and apply the Radial Basis Function (RBF) as the kernel function
which is written as K(xi, xj) = exp(−γ
∥∥xi − xj∥∥2). There are two pre-determined
parameters: C in Equation (5.9) and γ in the RBF. We set the value of C in the
range [2, 20] with steps of 2 and the value of γ in the range [0.1, 1] with steps of
0.1, which is similar to the approach used by Chen et al. (2009). So there are 10
values both for C and γ, respectively, and there are a total of 100 SVM models with
different combinations of values for C and γ. We choose the mean of the results
of these 100 models as the final prediction. The MATLAB programs for SVMs are
obtained from Chang and Lin (2011).4
3 The web site is http://blog.sina.com.cn/luzhenbo2.
4 The web site is http://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/ cjlin/libsvm.
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5.4 Sample and variables
The FDIC lists 355 bank failures in the period 2002–2010. After deleting 62 banks
due to data limitations, the final sample used includes 293 banks that failed. We se-
lect six groups of financial variables, Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management
quality, Earnings, Liquidity and Sensitivity to market risk (CAMELS)—based on
Kolari et al. (2002) and Boyacioglu et al. (2009). These financial ratios are listed
in Table 5.2. Financial data of banks are obtained from the Federal Financial Insti-
tutions Examination Council (FFIEC) Central Data Repository’s Public Data.5 As
Canbas, Cabuk, and Kilic (2005) find that the year before the bank failure is the
most important year for predictions, we employ the average of each financial ratio
spanning four quarters before a bank failure as leading indicators.
Table 5.2. The list of financial ratios
Categories indicators Acronym
Capital adequacy Equity/total assets CA1
Equity/total loans CA2
Asset quality Past due loans (>90)/ total assets AQ1
Nonaccrual loans / total assets AQ2
Provision for loan losses / total assets AQ3
Allowance for loan losses / total assets AQ4
Management Non-interest expenses/total debts M1
Non-interest expenses/ total assets M2
Personal salary/ total debts M3
Earnings Net income/ total assets E1
Net income/ Shareholder’s equity E2
Interest income/ total income E3
Liquidity Cash and securities/ total assets L1
Large time deposits / total assets L2
Sensitivity to market risk Net interest income/ total assets SM1
Total securities/ total assets SM2
Averages do not cover the speed of financial ratios’ deterioration. A higher de-
terioration speed may suggest that a bank has a higher probability of getting into
5 The web site is https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public.
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trouble. To capture the speed of changes for financial ratios in vulnerable banks, we
use the rate of change of each financial ratio one year before a bank fails as another
potential leading indicator.
The rate of change is defined as follows. Let Ai, (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) be the ith quarter
before the quarter in which a bank failed. For example, if a bank fails in 2008Q3,
then 2008Q2 is labeled as A1, 2008Q1 is labeled as A2, 2007Q4 is labeled as A3
and 2007Q3 is labeled as A4. Let XAi be the values of a vector of financial ratios
in the quarter Ai. Then, XA1 is the vector of financial ratios in 2008Q2, XA2 is the
vector of financial ratios in 2008Q1 and so on. The rate of change of the financial
ratio in A1 compared to A2 is ∆XA1 = (XA1 − XA2)/XA2. We use the average of
the three rates of change, that is ∆X = (∆XA1 + ∆XA2 + ∆XA3)/3.
5.5 Empirical results
5.5.1 Data properties
There were 36 bank failures during the period 2002–2008, while the number of bank
failures in 2009 and 2010 is 120 and 137, respectively. We choose bank failures from
2002 to 2009 as the ex post sample (in-sample prediction) and bank failures in 2010
as the ex ante sample (out-of-sample prediction).
After that, we employ the independent sample t-test to compare the difference
of each financial variable between the group of bank failures and the group of banks
that did not fail using the ex post sample. According to the t-test results shown in
Table 5.3, 12 financial variables and 6 rates of change show significant differences.
Therefore, we select these 18 variables to predict bank failures.
In addition, we normalize these selected variables by the standard score method
which helps improving the prediction power of data mining models. Take the vari-
able CA1 (Equity/total assets) in Table 5.2, for example. Let e be a vector of the
raw values of CA1, µ is the mean of e, and σ is the standard deviation of e, then the
standard score vector z for CA1 is calculated as z = (e− µ)/σ.
Then, we calculate correlations between the 18 selected financial variables. Re-
sults (not shown) indicate that significant multi-collinearity does exist among some
of these variables. The results of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) test and Bartlett’s
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Table 5.3. Statistics and the independent sample t-test
Variables banks that did not fail banks that failed t-test
Mean Std. Mean Std.
CA1 0.64 1.41 −0.38 0.46 8.58 ***
CA2 0.54 1.52 −0.34 0.32 7.11 ***
AQ1 −0.09 0.33 0.21 1.81 −2.06 **
AQ2 −0.40 0.34 0.29 1.31 −6.36 ***
AQ3 −0.65 0.36 0.46 1.12 −11.75 ***
AQ4 −0.57 0.43 0.3 1.05 −9.63 ***
M1 0.11 1.87 0.00 0.44 0.74
M2 −0.05 1.45 0.13 1.10 −1.24
M3 0.22 1.76 −0.07 0.65 1.96 **
E1 0.77 0.45 −0.59 1.11 14.32 ***
E2 −0.01 0.00 0.13 1.83 −0.96
E3 −0.02 0.11 −0.07 0.45 1.55
L1 0.29 1.09 −0.16 0.86 4.02 ***
L2 −0.08 0.88 0.42 1.25 −4.15 ***
SM1 0.33 0.95 −0.17 0.90 4.75 ***
SM2 0.28 1.17 −0.16 0.83 3.83 ***
∆CA1 0.29 0.10 −0.28 0.71 9.84 ***
∆CA2 0.30 0.11 −0.28 0.70 10.16 ***
∆AQ1 −0.01 0.59 0.03 0.95 −0.45
∆AQ2 −0.01 0.66 −0.01 0.35 −0.09
∆AQ3 −0.02 0.69 −0.04 0.15 −0.41
∆AQ4 −0.3 0.41 0.45 1.28 −6.89 ***
∆M1 −0.22 0.74 0.32 1.20 −4.81 ***
∆M2 −0.25 0.70 0.37 1.25 −5.43 ***
∆M3 −0.01 0.77 0.02 0.90 −0.33
∆E1 0.09 1.71 0.01 0.49 0.59
∆E2 0.04 0.89 −0.10 1.24 −1.19
∆E3 0.01 0.09 −0.11 1.10 1.29
∆L1 0.1 1.38 0.06 1.33 0.25
∆L2 −0.14 0.96 0.1 0.93 −2.23 ***
∆SM1 −0.06 0.16 0.14 1.86 −1.33
∆SM2 0.12 1.94 −0.05 0.02 1.05
Notes: See Table 5.2 for definitions of variables. ∆ denotes the rate of change for
the corresponding financial ratio. ** p <0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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test of sphericity (shown in Table 5.4) also suggest that factor analysis should be
applied before employing the logit model (Canbas, Cabuk and Kilic, 2005).
Table 5.4. Results of KMO and Bartlett’s test of sphericity
KMO 0.629
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity Chi-Square 11540
df 153
Sig. 0.000
Notes: The tests here are used to determine whether factor analysis should
be employed. The null hypothesis of Bartlett’s test is that the correlation
matrix is the same to the identity matrix and there is no need to employing
factor analysis.
We employ Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to deal with multi-collinearity
in estimating the logit model. Eigenvalues and variances of factors are shown in
Table 5.5. Based on the two criteria that (1) the factors should account for at least
70% of the cumulative variance, and (2) the eigenvalue should be greater than 1, we
choose the first 7 factors which can explain 80.42% of the cumulative variance for
18 selected financial variables. Table 5.6 shows the factor loadings for each financial
variable.
Table 5.5. Eigenvalues and variance of factors
Factors Eigenvalue % of Variance Cumulative (%)
F1 2.773 15.407 15.407
F2 2.580 14.331 29.739
F3 2.419 13.437 43.176
F4 2.061 11.450 54.625
F5 2.002 11.122 65.747
F6 1.339 7.439 73.186
F7 1.301 7.230 80.416
According to Table 5.5 and Table 5.6, the first factor represents two groups of
variables with high explanatory power: asset quality (AQ3, AQ4) and earnings (E1)
and it explains 15.41% of the total variance. The second factor represents manage-
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ment (∆M1, ∆M2) and liquidity (∆L2), explaining 14.33% of the total variance.
The third factor represents capital adequacy (CA1, CA2) and management (M3),
and it explains 13.44% of the total variance. The fourth factor represents capital
adequacy (∆CA1, ∆CA2), and it explains 11.45% of the total variance. The fifth
factor represents sensitivity to market risk (SM2) and liquidity (L1), and it explains
11.12% of the total variance. The sixth factor represents sensitivity to market risk
(SM1), and it explains 7.44% of the total variance. The final factor represents as-
set quality (AQ1), and it explains 7.23% of the total variance. In general, the seven
selected factors cover all six groups of variables and both the level and the rates of
change of the financial ratios.
Table 5.6. Factor loading matrix for factor analysis
Var F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7
CA1 −0.234 −0.036 0.877 0.143 0.037 0.235 −0.099
CA2 −0.173 −0.047 0.885 0.103 0.279 0.146 −0.091
AQ1 −0.041 0.067 0.011 −0.002 0.002 0.033 0.847
AQ2 0.436 0.015 −0.052 −0.007 −0.038 −0.091 0.644
AQ3 0.901 0.144 −0.089 −0.083 −0.118 −0.087 0.073
AQ4 0.841 0.069 −0.068 −0.051 −0.175 0.067 0.119
M3 −0.009 −0.066 0.866 −0.112 0.001 −0.132 0.134
E1 −0.725 −0.151 0.214 0.225 0.107 0.424 −0.119
L1 −0.134 −0.026 0.113 0.049 0.957 0.028 −0.003
L2 0.330 0.016 −0.081 0.060 −0.126 −0.468 −0.258
SM1 0.165 0.023 0.090 0.132 −0.071 0.878 −0.117
SM2 −0.095 −0.029 0.104 0.062 0.958 −0.009 −0.010
∆CA1 −0.157 −0.044 0.029 0.976 0.057 0.049 −0.001
∆CA2 −0.150 −0.048 0.043 0.976 0.060 0.057 −0.014
∆AQ4 0.466 −0.005 −0.097 −0.143 0.057 0.216 −0.053
∆M1 0.079 0.967 −0.056 −0.033 −0.019 −0.002 −0.021
∆M2 0.119 0.955 −0.057 −0.057 −0.026 −0.026 −0.020
∆L2 0.044 0.815 −0.023 −0.009 −0.018 0.018 0.124
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5.5.2 Prediction results
We apply the 7 factors to estimate the logit model, and employ the original 18 se-
lected financial variables to estimate data mining models as data mining models do
not require low multi-collinearity among independent variables. So in a NN model,
the number of nodes in the hidden layer is 37 according to the Kolmogorov the-
orem as outlined in Section 5.3.4. The prediction results for all three models are
summarized in Table 5.7.
Table 5.7. Assessing the predictive power of the models
Index NN SVM logit
Prediction ex post
Total failures in FDIC 156 156 156
‘Correct failures’# 156 152.19 139
‘Correct non-failures’# 156 146.86 143
‘Missed failures’# 0 3.81 17
‘False alarms’# 0 9.14 13
Frequency of ‘missed failures’ 0.00% 2.44% 10.90%
Frequency of ‘false alarms’ 0.00% 5.86% 8.33%
Prediction ex ante
Total failures in FDIC 137 137 137
‘Correct failures’# 81 126.5 133
‘Correct non-failures’# 65 82.54 118
‘Missed failures’# 56 10.5 4
‘False alarms’# 72 54.46 19
Frequency of ‘missed failures’ 40.88% 7.66% 2.92%
Frequency of ‘false alarms’ 52.55% 39.75% 13.87%
Notes: This table shows the predictive power of the three models, and zooms in on ‘missed
failures’ and ‘false alarms’ in predicting bank failures. Definitions of ‘correct failures’ and
‘correct non-failures’ are given in Table 5.1. The ex post sample covers data from 2002 to
2009, the ex ante sample covers the data in 2010. ‘Frequency of missed failures’ equals
#(missed failures)/#(total failures in FDIC) and ‘Frequency of false alarms’ equals #(false
alarms)/#(total non-failures in the match-pair sample).
# For SVM models these numbers are averages of 100 models (see Section 5.3.4) and
therefore they have decimals.
Based on the ex post sample, the NN model predicts bank failures perfectly
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and issues neither missed failures nor false alarms. The SVM model issues 2.44%
missed failures and 5.86% false alarms. The logit model issues 10.90% missed fail-
ures and 8.33% false alarms. This difference indicates that data mining models pre-
dict bank failures ex post more precisely than the logit model. This finding is in line
with the results of previous studies cited in Section 5.2. In addition, the NN model
predicts bank failures ex post better than the SVM. This is the same result as found
by Boyacioglu, Kara and Baykan (2009).
In the ex ante sample, the NN model predicts 81 correct failures and 65 correct
non-failures and issues 40.88% missed failures and 52.55% false alarms. The SVM
model predicts 126.5 correct failures and 82.54 correct non-failures and it issues
fewer missed failures and false alarms than the NN model. Thus, the SVM model
predicts bank failures ex ante better than the NN model. But the logit model predicts
bank failures ex ante more precisely than the data mining models. Specifically, the
logit model predicts 133 correct failures and 118 correct non-failures, the highest for
all three models. In particular, the logit model predicts bank failures with accuracy
higher than 97% and predicts banks that did not fail with accuracy higher than 86%.
In addition, all three models issue more false alarms than missed failures, indi-
cating that many banks that did not fail are classified as bank failures. The reason is
that banks that did not fail are also in a difficult situation as they too were affected
by the financial crisis. For example, out of 137 non-failed banks in 2010, 9 banks
failed between 2011 and 2014, according to the information of the FDIC.
In Section 5.3.4, we choose 10 different values both for the C and γ parameters.
Table 5.8 shows the ex ante prediction results of 100 SVM models with different
pairs of parameter values (Table 5.7 gives the average of these 100 models). Predic-
tion results are different in SVM models for different parameters. Based on Equation
(5.9), a higher value of C means that a SVM model has to classify the two groups of
bank observations more precisely, thus in the ex ante sample there are fewer missed
failures. In contrast, there are more false alarms.
5.5.3 Sensitivity tests
In a particular state, there may be more than one bank that does not fail and has
similar bank asset size compared to the failed one. Based on the same selection
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Table 5.8. Prediction performance of SVM models (%)
HHHHHC
γ
0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
Missed failures
2 8.76 10.22 9.49 10.22 10.22 13.14 14.60 16.06 17.52 16.79
4 6.57 10.95 16.79 18.98 18.25 18.25 18.98 18.25 18.25 18.98
6 4.38 8.76 8.03 8.76 8.03 8.03 8.76 9.49 8.76 9.49
8 7.30 9.49 8.03 6.57 6.57 6.57 6.57 7.30 7.30 7.30
10 8.03 8.76 8.03 7.30 6.57 6.57 6.57 6.57 6.57 6.57
12 7.30 6.57 7.30 6.57 6.57 6.57 6.57 6.57 6.57 6.57
14 6.57 5.11 4.38 4.38 4.38 4.38 4.38 4.38 4.38 4.38
16 5.84 4.38 3.65 3.65 3.65 3.65 3.65 3.65 3.65 3.65
18 5.11 5.11 5.11 5.11 5.11 5.11 5.11 5.11 5.11 5.11
20 4.38 4.38 4.38 4.38 4.38 4.38 4.38 4.38 4.38 4.38
False alarms
2 26.28 28.47 32.12 32.12 30.66 30.66 29.93 29.20 29.93 30.66
4 32.12 30.66 28.47 32.85 32.85 31.39 31.39 31.39 31.39 32.12
6 35.04 35.77 35.77 36.50 35.77 36.50 37.96 37.96 37.96 37.23
8 33.58 37.23 37.23 39.42 40.15 39.42 39.42 39.42 38.69 38.69
10 35.77 39.42 40.15 38.69 38.69 39.42 39.42 39.42 39.42 39.42
12 36.50 41.61 40.88 40.88 40.88 40.88 40.88 40.88 40.88 40.88
14 42.34 43.80 43.80 43.07 43.07 43.07 43.07 43.07 43.07 43.07
16 44.53 44.53 43.07 43.07 43.07 43.07 43.07 43.07 43.07 43.07
18 46.72 47.45 46.72 46.72 46.72 46.72 46.72 46.72 46.72 46.72
20 48.91 48.91 48.18 48.18 48.18 48.18 48.18 48.18 48.18 48.18
Notes: C is the pre-determined parameter in Equation (5.9) and γ is the pre-determined parameter in the
RBF kernel function.
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rules: (1) near in asset size [-30%, 30%] to the bank that failed in the quarter of
failure and (2) located in the same state, we choose another set of 293 banks that did
not fail as the alternative match-pair sample. The results of the independent sample
t-test in Appendix Table D.1 show that 12 financial ratios and 7 rates of change are
significantly different across the failed and non-failed banks. Most of the 19 selected
variables are the same as those in Table 5.3. Table D.2 in the Appendix shows that
factor analysis yields 8 factors for the 19 selected financial variables. These factors
are used in the logit model.
Table 5.9 shows the prediction results of the three models based on the alterna-
tive matched sample. The NN model identifies bank failures and banks that did not
fail ex post better than the SVM and logit models. Specifically, the NN model is-
sues neither missed failures nor false alarms. The SVM model issues 2.84% missed
failures and 10.15% false alarms, and the logit model issues 10.9% missed failures
and 5.13% false alarms, so that data mining models outperform the logit model.
In the ex ante sample, the SVM model issues 11.44% missed failures and 39.15%
false alarms, i.e. fewer than those of the NN model. In addition, Table D.3 in the
Appendix shows that the predictions of SVMs are volatile for different parameter
values. In line with our previous finding, the logit model predicts bank failures and
bank non-failures ex ante more precisely than data mining models by issuing 3.65%
missed failures and 16.79% false alarms. Finally, the logit model predicts bank fail-
ures with accuracy higher than 96% and predicts banks that did not fail with ac-
curacy higher than 83%. These percentages are similar to the results reported in
the previous section. In general, the logit model predicts bank failures ex post less
precisely than data mining models, but more precisely ex ante.
5.5.4 Economic implications
The logit model has two advantages compared to data mining models. First, the logit
model shows more meaningful relationships between financial variables and bank
failures than data mining models, which enables bank supervisors to assess banks’
financial health (Canbas, Cabuk and Kilic, 2005). In a NN model, the parameters
W and U in Equation (5.3) have no clear meaning from an economic perspective.
Likewise, in a SVM model the parameters C in Equation (5.9) and γ in the RBF
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Table 5.9. Sensitivity results of the predictive power of the models
Index NN SVM logit
Prediction ex post
Total failures in FDIC 156 156 156
‘Correct failures’# 156 151.57 139
‘Correct non-failures’# 156 140.17 148
‘Missed failures’# 0 4.43 17
‘False alarms’# 0 15.83 8
Frequency of ‘missed failures’ 0.00% 2.84% 10.90%
Frequency of ‘false alarms’ 0.00% 10.15% 5.13%
Prediction ex ante
Total failures in FDIC 137 137 137
‘Correct failures’# 91 121.33 132
‘Correct non failures’# 57 83.36 114
‘Missed failures’# 46 15.67 5
‘False alarms’# 80 53.64 23
Frequency of ‘missed failures’ 33.58% 11.44% 3.65%
Frequency of ‘false alarms’ 58.39% 39.15% 16.79%
Notes: This table shows the predictive power of the three models, and zooms in on ‘missed
failures’ and ‘false alarms’ in predicting bank failures. Definitions of ‘correct failures’ and
‘correct non-failures’ are given in Table 5.1. The ex post sample covers data from 2002 to
2009, the ex ante sample covers the data in 2010. ‘Frequency of missed failures’ equals
#(missed failures)/#(total failures in FDIC) and ‘Frequency of false alarms’ equals #(false
alarms)/#(total non-failures in the match-pair sample).
# For SVM models these numbers are averages of 100 models (see Section 5.3.4) and
therefore they have decimals.
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also have no clear economic meaning.
For illustrative purposes, Table 5.10 shows the estimated coefficients and statis-
tics for the logit model in Table 5.7. All coefficients are statistically significant at
the 1% level showing that the 7 selected PCA factors add information in predicting
bank failures. The first factor (F1) has a significant positive coefficient indicating
that an increase of F1 leads to a more fragile bank. Moreover, Table 5.6 shows that
the first factor represents asset quality (Provisions for loan losses/total assets and
Allowances for loan losses/total assets) and earnings (Net income/total assets). As-
set quality is positively related to F1 indicating that an increase in provisions and
allowances for loan losses leads to a more fragile bank. The earning variable is neg-
atively related to F1 indicating that an increase of net income/total assets decreases
the probability of bank failure.
Table 5.10. Estimation results for the logit model
Factors coef. std. err. z-statistics p-value
F1 3.7463 0.5879 6.3700 0.0000
F2 1.3461 0.2857 4.7100 0.0000
F3 −4.7414 0.8150 −5.8200 0.0000
F4 −2.6981 0.9019 −2.9900 0.0030
F5 −1.3995 0.2993 −4.6800 0.0000
F6 −1.1301 0.3490 −3.2400 0.0010
F7 1.5657 0.5293 2.9600 0.0030
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes 1 when a bank fails
and 0 otherwise.
Secondly, the logit model has a higher accuracy in predicting bank failures as
has been shown in the previous sections. This advantage can reduce the cost of
rescuing troubled banks. In other words, if the bank supervisors detect financial
problems in a bank earlier, actions can be taken earlier to prevent this bank from
failing and/or to minimize the cost to the government and thus to taxpayers (Thom-
son, 1991). The results in Table 5.7 show that the logit model issues 2.92% missed
failures. This means that this model predicts 97.08% bank failures correctly. Thus,
bank supervisors can detect problems earlier with a reasonable accuracy by using
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this model and take timely actions to prevent a bank from failing.
5.6 Conclusions
Studies on the prediction of bank failures are important as the ability to differentiate
between banks in troubled and sound banks will enhance supervisors’ ability to
take timely actions to prevent banks from failing and/or to reduce the cost of bank
failures. This chapter compares the performance of the logit model and data mining
models in predicting bank failures. We collect 293 bank failures in the United States
during 2002 to 2010 and then create a match-pair sample by the selection rules: (1)
near in asset size [-30%, 30%] to the bank that failed in the quarter of failure and
(2) located in the same state. Based on this sample, we use 16 financial ratios and
their rates of change to predict bank failures. We use the data from 2002 to 2009 as
the ex post sample to estimate the models, and apply the data in 2010 as the ex ante
sample for evaluation.
Empirical results show that between the two data mining models, SVMs pre-
dict bank failures better than NNs. For all three models, the logit model issues
more missed failures and false alarms ex post than the data mining models, but
issues fewer missed failures and false alarms ex ante. This conclusion is robust if
we choose another match-pair sample based on the same selection rules. Moreover,
the logit model predicts bank failures with accuracy higher than 96%, and predicts
banks that do not fail with accuracy higher than 83%.
The logit model allows a better understanding of the relationship between fi-
nancial variables and bank failures which enables bank supervisors to assess banks’
financial health more efficiently. In addition, the logit model has a higher ability to
predict bank failures reducing the expected bailouts cost and/or minimize the cost
to the public. Therefore, the logit model can be used as a decision support tool for
detecting bank problems.
A drawback of principal components analysis as applied here is that sometimes
these components are hard to interpret and their number may be uncertain. Despite
these drawbacks, we feel that their economic interpretation is much easier than that
of the data mining models discussed in this chapter.
